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Abstract 
The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 received a statement of compati-
bility under sl9 of the Human Rights Act 1998.1 Yet the provisions under 
slO and s63 of the Immigration and Asylum Act (hereafter IAA) effec-
tively remove the right of appeal for most deportees, continuing a trend 
which began with the Immigration Act 1988. This paper will examine the 
process by which deportation will be administered under the IAA in the 
light of the obligations pertaining to private and family life and the right 
not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment under the 
Human Rights Act (hereafter HRA).2 The question will be asked 'is there 
a right not to be deported under the Human Rights Act 1998?' 
GROUNDS FOR DEPORTATION 
s5 of the Immigration Act 1971 allows the Secretary of State to make a 
deportation order against a person who is liable to deportation under, 
s3(5) and 3(6) Immigration Act 1971.3 This includes overstayers and 
those who breach a condition of entry; those whose deportation is deemed 
to be conducive to the public good, usually after conviction for a criminal 
offence; spouses and children of another person being deported and those 
recommended for deportation by a court.4 Rule 364 of the Immigration 
rules HC 395 requires the Secretary of State to balance the public interest 
against the compassionate circumstances of the case. He is specifically 
obliged to consider a list of factors including age; length of residence in 
* Lecturer in Public Law, University of North London. 
1 Statements of Human Rights Act compatibility have been given to all legislation including the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act, with the exception of the Local Government Bill which contains the 
discriminatory Clause 2S provision. 
2 Article 8 and Article 3 respectively. 
3 Immigration officers can be empowered by the Secretary of State to make a deportation decision 
following the HL decision in K v SSHD exjx Oladelwuk [1990] 3 All ER 393. 
4 s3(6) following recommendation by a court.- anyone over the age of 17 years and convicted of a 
criminal offence can be recommended for deportation. There are numerous immigration offences 
that can give rise to a deportation recommendation, for example overstaying (s24(l)(b)i IA 1971) 
and seeking entry by deception (s24 anil s25 AIA 1996). 
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the UK; personal history including conduct and employment record; 
previous criminal record and strength of connections with the UK. 
As far as nationals of the European Economic Area are concerned, they 
can only be deported on the grounds listed in Directive 68/360/EEC; 
namely public policy, public health and public security. In R v Bouchereau 
it was held that an EC national could only be deported if they are a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat to public policy affecting one of 
the fundamental interests of society.5 
BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT DEPORTATION CHANGES 
The Immigration Act 1988 restricted the right of appeal for potential 
deportees who had been in the UK for less than 7 years/1 For those in the 
UK for less than this time, the appeal was confined to the issue of whether 
such an order was in accordance with the law in terms of s3 (5) IA 1971; 
compassionate factors under para. 364 HC 395 were removed from the 
appellate jurisdiction. The House of Lords decisions in Malhi and 
Oladehinde established that procedural errors are not grounds to be 
considered in a restricted s5(l) appeal7 and it had been held that there 
could be no legitimate expectation that cieportation decisions would 
consider the ECHR obligations in such an appeals.8 However, since the 
decision in Abdi, it has been established that internal guidance and 
human rights issues could be addressed by an appellate authority even in 
the restricted appeal.9 
MARRIAGE POLICY 
Since the decision in Berrehab v Netherlands, discussed below, it has been 
Home Office internal policy to consider established family life in deciding 
whether to issue a notice of deportation in line with Article 8 of the 
ECHR. The Home Office operates concessions which are outside the 
immigration rules and the role of the appellate adjudicator is to consider 
whether the facts of the case would bring it within the policy and whether 
the Home Office had properly considered the terms of the policy.10 
5 [1977] ECR 1999. 
6s5 IA 1988 - people who entered the UK less than 7 years before the date of appeal have only a 
limited right of appeal on the grounds that there was no power in law to make such an order. 
7 applied by the IAT in Dharam Singh v SSHD Appeal TH 8580/97 (G00044) 16.4.99. 
8 Judith Cam! Poc/i v SSHD 1AT TH/40449/95 (17127) 20.5.98. 
9 R v SSHU cxp. Adbi (1996] I mm AR 148. 
10 Ibid. 
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Para. 5 of the concession DP 3/96 states the general rule that deportation 
action under s3(5)IA 1971 should not normally be initiated where the 
subject has a genuine and subsisting marriage with someone settled here 
and the couple have lived together in this country continuously for 2 
years prior to enforcement action; and it is unreasonable to suspect the 
settled spouse to accompany the spouse on removal. In considering the 
latter point, it may be particularly important to demonstrate established 
family ties. If the deportee has criminal convictions, the severity of the 
offence should be balanced against the strength of family ties." 
A Home Office concession also operates for children who have been in 
the UK continuously for longer than 7 years. In introducing this conces-
sion, Home Office minister Mike O'Brien stated "In most cases the ties 
established by children over this period will outweigh other considerations 
and it is right and fair that the family should be allowed to stay here".12 
Home Office guidance suggests that deportation will not normally be 
commenced against parents whose children have been resident for seven 
years or more continuously. However, the advice goes on to state that in 
cases of poor immigration history, this presumption can be rebutted.'5 
Cohabitation 
Home Office policy DP2/93, drafted with the decision in Berrehab in 
mind, applied equally to cohabiting couples who could show conclusive 
evidence to demonstrate that they had cohabited for two years prior to 
enforcement action.14 However, DP3/96 which superseded the previous 
policy, removes that concession for cohabiting partners. Some unmarried 
partners may be able to take advantage of the Common Law and Same 
Sex Relationship concession of 1998 as amended. The latter however, is 
largely aimed at couples in same sex relationships as the criteria states 
that the parties should be 'legally unable to marry'.15 
The result of these concessions is that settled spouses who have been 
married for two years prior to enforcement action and couples who are 
11 DP3/96 para 6. 
12 HC Debates, Hansard 24th Feb 1999 Col MO. 
1? HC Debates Hansard 24th Feb. 1999 Col 1121-1 HO. 
14 R v SSHD ex/>. Watson CO/2055/94 2.4.96 at 498; R v SSHD exp. Darby CO/2259/95 5.2.1996. 
15 Common law and same sex relationships IDI Aug 1998 Chp. 8, Section 7 para. 2 as amended hy 
Immigration Minister Mike O'Brien on 16th June 1999 HC debates Hansard col. 164. 
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legally unable to marry (otherwise than by consanguinity and age) who 
have lived in a relationship 'akin to marriage' for two years prior to 
enforcement action will not normally be subjected to a deportation 
action. In both cases it must also be demonstrated that it is unreasonable 
to expect the settled party to accompany the potential deportee on 
removal. 
DP3/96 is more restrictive than its predecessor and there is no specific 
reference to Article 8 of the ECHR. Those couples who are legally able 
but have chosen not to marry may not seek to rely on these concessions, 
as a result their family life may be in danger of being violated. 
ABOLITION OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 
s63 and Schedule 14 para.44(2) of the IAA 1999 provide that appeals 
against deportation will only be available where the deportation is deemed 
to be conducive to the public good or in family cases (creating a new 
s3(5)a and s3(5)b IA 1971). All other categories of deportees will now be 
liable to administrative removal under slO IAA 99.16 The objective of the 
proposals clearly placed speed over justice; the White Paper aimed "to 
provide a single right of appeal to those who were lawfully present in the 
UK at the time of their application to remain in the UK. The appeal 
would be held quickly after the initial decision had been made and there 
would be no separate appeal against removal".17 
It is arguable whether speed will indeed be promoted by these appeal 
restrictions as the only avenue for a person seeking to challenge a depor-
tation decision will be to make an application for asylum or to make a 
human rights appeal under s65 IAA 99. The application for asylum may 
be used as a stalling mechanism but unless the applicant can demonstrate 
a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the five Convention reasons 
they will not be able to avoid deportation action.18 It is for this reason 
that this article will concentrate on the s65 appeal. 
16 With the exception (it appeals under the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 
which provides for a full riyht of appeal in national security cases following the ECHR decision in 
Chahal v UK. 
17 Fnircr, Faster and fiwxer: a modem approach to immigration and asylum Cm 4018 para. 7.15. 
18 A right of appeal is provided against refusal in asylum cases, on the grounds that removal would 
he contrary to the UK's obligations under the Geneva Convention - s8(4) Asylum and Immigration 
Appeals Act 1995. 
[2001] The Human Rights of Deportees in the English Legal System 7 
The Human Rights Appeal 
An express right of appeal to an adjudicator is provided by s65 of the IAA 
for people who contend that their human rights have been breached by a 
public authority contrary to s6(l) HRA1998. Such a public authority will 
include the Secretary of State, Immigration Officers and the Entry 
Clearance Officer.19 Those people carrying out a public function who are 
not expressly mentioned may still be the subject of an action under the 
HRA itself as the definition under s6(3) HRA is much wider than that 
contained in s65 IAA.20 
Impact of the Human Rights Act 
STATUS OF THE CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW 
Case law preceeding the introduction of the Human Rights Act provides 
an indication of the interpretative approach that the courts would adopt 
post October 2nd. In exp. Taiye Ajayi and Essieoghen,21 Justice Laws 
declined to hold that there could be a legitimate expectation that the 
Home Secretary will consider Article 8 prior to issuing a deportation 
order. Providing that the Home Secretary considers the effect of deporta-
tion as required by the policy guidelines prior to issuing the removal notice 
and the decision can not be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable, there 
will be no successful challenge in judicial review. Since this decision cases 
have evolved to require the Secretary of State to engage in a balancing 
act. In exp. Gangadeen22 the CA held that a balancing Act should be 
conducted stressing that the greater the interference with human rights 
the more the court would require by way of justification. The court also 
held that great importance should be attached to the rights of children. 
In exp. McQuillan, Sedley J emphasised the need to conduct a balancing 
act when considering possible violations of human rights: 
"Once it is accepted that the standards articulated in the 
Convention are standards which both match those of the 
common law and inform the jurisprudence of the European 
Union, it becomes unreal and potentially unjust to continue to 
develop English public law without reference to them...the stan-
19 s65(7) IAA 1999. 
20 s6(3) covers "any person certain of whose functions are of a public nature". 
21 High Court Co/1605/92 12.5.94. 
22 [1998) ImmAR106. 
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dard of justification of infringements of rights and freedoms by 
executive decision must vary in proportion to the significance of 
the right which is at issue..." 
Such an approach has been endorsed by the Master of the Rolls in R v 
Ministry of Defence exp. Smith:23 "The more substantial the interference 
with human rights, the more the Court will require by way of justification 
before it is satisfied that the decision is reasonable...". Failure to under-
take the balancing exercise may result in a decision being declared ultra 
vires. 
APPLYING EUROPEAN CONVENTION JURISPRUDENCE 
The protection of private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. 
(i) evidence of private or family life 
Although, private life has been given a wide definition in Strasbourg 
jurisprudence,24 there remains some reticence about applying it in an 
immigration context. This is a recognition of the inevitability that 
private life will be adversely affected by deportation proceedings. 
However, in Boughanemi v France, the European Court of Human 
Rights recognised that immigration measures could disproportion-
ately affect private life25 and in C v Belgium, the court found that 
social ties accumulated over a number of years could amount to 
private life within the meaning of Article 8.26 
Private life is given some recognition in domestic immigration law by 
the concessions relating to people with long residence. Persons 
legally in the UK for ten years or illegally for fourteen years can take 
advantage of these concessions. There is a legitimate expectation 
after the time has expired that deportation action will not be 
commenced except in exceptional circumstances. If deportation 
action commences before the expiry of the term, the action will stop 
the clock and no legitimate expectation can arise.27 
23 [1996] 2WLR205. 
24 Niemitz v Germany (1992) Series A No 251-B para 29; Feldman "The developing scope of 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights" [1997] EHRLR 265. 
25 (1996) 22EHRR228. 
26 C i' Belgium App 00021794/93 07/08/1996 para. 25. 
27 O/nri (1994) 26th July CA (unreported) , K v SSHD exp. Uusuh (1994) 10th Nov. CA. 
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As far as family life is concerned, evidence of well-established family 
ties in the United Kingdom will need to be demonstrated. Family life 
is now considered to extend beyond legitimate formal relationships.28 
It has been established in the case of Abdulaziz29 that Article 8 does 
not guarantee a right to establish family life in a particular state. In 
exp. Watson, it was held that states have a wide margin of apprecia-
tion in determining the steps necessary to ensure compliance with 
Article 8. The right to respect for family life did not extend to 
providing an obligation on a state to respect the decision of married 
couples to choose their place of residence.10 
(ii) interference 
The Court will not find an interference where it is possible for family 
life to be resumed elsewhere.?' In exp. Sultana the CA held, obiter, 
that there was no interference with family life as a British citizen 
whose husband was threatened with deportation to Pakistan could 
reasonably be expected to accompany him with their children.32 
(iii) Article 8(2): justification for infringement 
The state will need to show that the interference is sanctioned by 
the law and provide a legitimate reason as listed in Article 8(2). The 
measure will also need to be 'necessary in a democratic society'. In 
deciding whether the interference corresponds to a pressing social 
need the Court will consider the proportionality of the measure and 
will often defer to the margin of appreciation. In cases deemed 
conducive to the public good this may be a particular problem for 
the potential deportee. In the most serious cases something quite 
overwhelming will need to be demonstrated in order that the family 
life will not be disrupted. This is the case even when family members 
likely to be effected are British citizens. 
The case of Berrehab v Netherlands"'"' is extremely significant in the deporta-
tion context. The case concerned a Moroccan man threatened with 
28 Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330; Kman v Netherlands (1994) 19 EHRR 263. This issue is 
discussed further in Liddy "The concept of family life under the European Convention on Human 
Rights" [19981 EHRLR15. 
29 (1985) 7 EHRR 471. 
30 R v SSHD exp. Watson CO/2055/94 2.4.96 at 498. 
31 Abdulaziz et al v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 471. 
32 K v SSHD exp. Shakeela Sultana FC3/97/5411/D 13.6.97. 
33 Herrehab v Netherlands 3/1987/126/177. 
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deportation after his marriage to a Dutch woman broke down. The ECHR 
held that the applicant's right to family life would be violated by the depor-
tation as he had retained regular contact with his young daughter. The 
approach of the court endorses the fact that the removal of a father in such 
circumstances would be clearly disproportionate to the interests of the state. 
The decision in Berrehab led to the changes in Home Office departmental 
policy discussed above. In the case of children, HO policy indicates that 
an applicant who has regular access to a child should not face removal. It 
was established that this applies irrespective of cohabitation or marriage.34 
It is apparent that each case will be deciding on its facts and the public 
interest will be weighed against the disruption to private and family life. 
In Mehemi v France, the Court found that despite the applicant's criminal 
conviction for drugs offences, the strength of his family links with France 
and the likely separation from his wife and daughter would be dispropor-
tionate to the legitimate aim pursued.15 A similar decision was reached in 
Nasri v France where the applicant had special needs which required 
particular support from his family.16 
The decision of the European Commission Poku v UK17 however, is more 
restrictive and has been criticised for weighting the balance against the 
applicant and giving to much respect for the margin of appreciation. As 
the couple had married when the applicant had already been subject to 
deportation proceedings there was no obstacle preventing the couple and 
their children from choosing to move to Ghana. Therefore any disruption 
in family life would have been a result of the couple's choice not to leave 
the UK together. It was found to be inevitable and indeed acceptable that 
immigration decisions would lead to some disruption in family relation-
ships. This approach was echoed by the court in Bouchelkia v France^ in 
which it was established that family life must be established prior to the 
deportation order: 
"the fact that, after the deportation order was made and while he 
was an illegal immigrant, he built up a new family life does not 
justify finding, a posteriori, that the deportation order made and 
executed was not necessary".'9 
H R v S.SHD exp. Meftah Zighem [1996] Imm AR 194. 
35 App 00025017/94 26/09/97. 
36 App 00019465/92 13/07/95 para. 43. 
37 26985/95. 
38 112/1995/618/708 22/01/1997. 
39 Ibid, at para. 52. 
V 
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The approach in Poku and Bouchelkia appears to endorse the Home 
Office guidance in DP3/96. 
The issue of proportionality was again raised in the decision of Gul v 
Switzerland40 concerning the family life of a Kurdish family from Turkey. 
Mr Gul had been granted exceptional leave on compassionate grounds 
and his wife had been receiving medical treatment. They had a daughter 
born in Switzerland in 1988. The family applied for their younger son to 
join them from Turkey and this was refused. The Commission found that 
they could reasonably be expected to move to Turkey despite the fact that 
their 8 yr old daughter had never been to Turkey and spoke no Turkish. 
This particularly restrictive decision could be attributed to the fact that 
the Commission were careful to avoid establishing a positive duty on a 
state to unite families. 
In determining the legitimacy of deportation orders the domestic appel-
late authorities have engaged in a similar balancing exercise. The 
Immigration Appeals Tribunal have held that an appellant should not be 
deported to Syria as the disruption to his family life outweighed the public 
good requirements of immigration control. It would have been dispropor-
tionate to expect a Christian wife who did not speak Arabic and her two 
children to settle with the appellant in Syria.41 
As far as cases deemed conducive to the public good are concerned it 
would appear that the responses of the English courts are in keeping with 
the Strasbourg line established in Boughanerni v France when the ECHR 
held that the deportation of a Tunisian man who had lived in France since 
the age of 8 and had well-established family ties there was not dispropor-
tionate under Article 8 as he had committed various criminal offences.42 
In Byron Scott, the IAT held that when an appellant had been convicted 
of possessing Class A drugs with intent to supply and had served a five 
year prison sentence, his family ties could be outweighed by the serious-
ness of the offence and the possibility of him reoffending.4 ? The balancing 
execise is crucial and in B v SSHD, the Court of Appeal held that when 
dealing with an Italian national threatened with deportaion under 
Community law, the same test of proportionality must also be applied. In 
40 53/1995/559/645 (1996) 11 EHRR 95. 
41 AMHI Aldcbs v SSHD 1AT Appeal: 13392 14.5.96. 
42 ECHR 16/1995/522/608. 
43 Ryrnn Anthony Scott v SSHD 31.1.2000 TH/4837/98 (22532). The same decision was reached on 
very similar facts by a differently constituted tribunal in the earlier case of Muhmood v SSHD 
TH/40326/94 (10804) 12.4.94. 
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this case the court found that the appellant's ties were 'real and substan-
tial' and the decision to deport was so severe as to be dispoportionate to 
the risk of reoffending.44 
The test under Article 8 of the ECHR is to justify deportation as 'neces-
sary in a democratic society' and this is arguably a much more stringent 
test than simply balancing the compassionate circumstances against the 
public interest as required by DP3/96 and para. 364 HC 395The decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights indicate two clear restrictions on 
the extent of Article 8 protection: i) a potential deportee cannot attempt 
to use Article 8 rights to evade immigration control; ii) there is no posi-
tive duty on a state to respect family life 8 when determining entry 
clearance. 
In domestic law, if a person marries after enforcement action has taken 
place then according to DP3/96 they will have no protection from depor-
tation unless there are children. This is clearly in line with the 
Commission's restrictive interpretation in Poku. In exp. Mirza,45 the appli-
cant had contended that DP2/93 was ambiguous in this respect and that 
the court should therefore have regard to Convention jurisprudence 
following exp. Brine!.46 However, it was held that there was no ambiguity 
and that DP2/93 made it an overriding requirement that the marriage 
pre-dated enforcement action. In exp. Telia, where the marriage had taken 
place post commencement of enforcement action, the CA held that the 
wife and young children of a Nigerian national could reasonably be 
expected to accompany him on removal.47 
In a recent decision involving a Pakistani national married to a British 
citizen, the Court of Appeal criticised the drafting of DP 3/96.48 The 
policy was found not to cater for the applicant's circumstances as he had 
entered without obtaining entry clearance. Furthermore, the court found 
that although the applicant had a common law right to cohabit in a 
geniune marriage, the role of the court in judicial review proceedings 
should be confined to the decision making process rather than the merits 
of the case. In this case the decision of the Secretary of State to remove 
the applicant as an illegal entrant could not be said to be unresonable in 
a Wednesbury sense. 
44 B v SSHD [2000] Imm AR 478. 
45 R v SSHD exl>. Mirza and Others, CA Appeal No: 95/7506/D 23.3.96. 
46(1991] AC 696. 
47 K v SSHV exp. Telia IAT: FC3 96/5215/D 29.4.1995. 
48 R v SSHD exp Amjad Mahmood Times January 9th 2000. 
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A GAP IN PROTECTION: APPLICATION TO COHABITEES 
Here we can see that the development of English law has not be in 
keeping with the ECHR. It has already been noted that the concession in 
DP3/96 does not generally apply to cohabiting couples yet there is nothing 
in the case law of Strasbourg to endorse such an approach. Family life is 
not dependent upon cohabitation. The Court in Berrehab stated: 
"it follows from the concept of family on which Article 8 is based 
that a child born of such a union is ipso jure part of that relation-
ship; hence, from the moment of the child's birth and by the very 
fact of it, there exists between him and his parents a bond 
amounting to "family life", even if the parents are not then living 
together".49 
The High Court in exp. Gyampo took a literal interpretation of Berrehab50 
in finding that a father of a young child could be deported. The reasoning 
appears to be two-fold: on the one hand the father had only retained 
occasional contact with his son; and on the other hand Berrehab was 
distinguished as the child in this case was not born of a 'lawful genuine 
marriage'. It is submitted that this approach must be erroneous and does 
not take into account the spirit of Article 8 or the teleological approach 
of the European Court. 
THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
Particularly relevant to issues under Article 8 of the ECHR, the margin of 
appreciation has been applied by the ECHR to allow the governments of 
member states a certain amount of discretion in determining the public 
interest within those states. Although clearly a concept of international 
law, it remains to be seen as to how far domestic courts will adopt a similar 
line of reasoning. In a recent article on the decision in exp. Kebeline it has 
been argued by Kerrigan that the provision under s2 HRA that courts 
should have regard to the decisions and opinions of the Strasbourg 
authorities inevitably brings the margin of appreciation closer to home as 
domestic courts will have difficulty in extrapolating and removing the 
margin of appreciation when interpreting Strasbourg case law.51 Kerrigan 
derives support from this disconcerting prediction from the reasoning of 
Lord Hope in exp. Kebeline: 
49 Benehab v Netherlands (1988) 11 EHRR 322 para. 355. 
50 R v SS'HD exp. Gyampv CO/1612/94 9.2.1995. 
51 Kerrigan "Right to a Fair Hearing" CivLihs [2000] 64 at 79. 
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"In some circumstances it will be appropriate for the courts to 
recognise that there is an area of judgement within which the 
judiciary will defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered 
opinion of the elected body..."52 
T H E DECISION IN E X P R 
On Novermber 29th 2000, the High Court delivered the first indication 
that Article 8 would make a significant difference in deportations deemed 
conducive to the public good.5'* R was a Colombian national who had 
entered the UK with his common law wife and their three children. He 
had been refused asylum and exceptional leave and had been issued with 
removal directions following conviction for a series of criminal offences. 
He applied for a judicial review on the basis that his removal would pose 
a serious threat to his family life contrary to Article 8. In dismissing the 
application whilst his wife's leave application was determined, the High 
Court held that removal would constitute a serious breach of Article 8 
and that it would be dispoportionate to order such removal on account of 
his criminal conviction. 
T H E PROHIBITION O N I N H U M A N A N D DEGRADING TREATMENT 
Protection offered under Article 3 of the ECHR needs to be considered in 
the light of the prohibition on refoulement contained in the Geneva 
Convention on the Status of Refugees 1951. Article 33 of the Geneva 
Convention contains the fundamental principle of non-refoulement which 
is the cornerstone of international refugee protection. Although the 
Convention is not incorporated directly into English law, si Asylum and 
Immigration Appeals Act 1993 annexes the Convention to domestic law.54 
The principle only applies to people recognised as falling within the scope 
of Article 1 of the Geneva Convention, that is people who experience 
persecution for a Convention reason namely on account of their race, reli-
gion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a social group. 
The prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment offered by Article 
3 ECHR provides wider protection than that offered by Article 33 of the 
Geneva Convention. In the latter, a person can be removed from the UK 
52 K v DPP cxp. Kcbeline unj Others HL [1999] 4 All ER 801 at 843. 
5 3 R v SSHU cxp R Times Nov 29th 2000. 
54 si AIAA 1993 defines an asylum claim as 'a claim made (whether before or after the coming 
into force of this section) that it would be contrary to the UK's obligations under the Convention 
for him to he removed from, or required to leave, the UK'. 
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if their presence constitutes a danger to national security or if they commit 
a serious non-political crime.55 If a potential deportee constitutes a dangei 
to national security the court will engage in a balancing exercise to decide 
whether the circumstances are such that the principle of non-refoule-
ment should be waived.56 
Case law57 under Article 3 indicates that the ill-treatment must reach a 
minimum level of severity which will depend on the circumstances of the 
particular case.58 There is no requirement that the ill-treatment be perpe-
trated by the state authorities. In Ahmed v Austria the applicant 
successfully argued that his deportation to Somalia following a criminal 
conviction would expose him to a serious risk of mal-treatment at the 
hands of the Somalian authorities.59 It is apparent in this case that his 
expulsion would have fallen within the exception to the non-refoulement 
principle in Article 33 (2) of the Geneva Convention. A similar decision 
was reached in the case of Chahal v UK which had profound ramifications 
for domestic refugee law.60 Prior to the decision in Chahal there had been 
no effective appeal in national security cases.61 The only challenge was by 
way of judicial review on the basis that the Secretary of State had failed to 
consider international obligations prior to making a deportation decision.62 
The Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 established a new 
appeal process for national security cases that would allow Article 3 issues 
to be addressed. In both Ahmed and Chahal, the court reiterated the 
fundamental prohibition on expulsion in Article 3 cases: 
"the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable 
or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration"6' 
This approach was endorsed by the Commission in MAR v UK64 after the 
IAT upheld the Secretary of State's decision to deport an Iranian national 
55 Article 33(2) Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees 1951. 
56 Rizastraie v S'SHD CA 2.5.95. The CA held in this case that the risk to the community of 
allowing a convicted drug supplier to remain in the UK outweighed his risk of persecution on return 
to Iran. 
57 Ireland v UK (1978) Series A No 25 para. 162, 2 EHRR 25. 
58 Ibid, relevant factors include the nature of the treatment; the duration and the psychological an 
physical effects para. 162. 
59 (1996) 24 EHRR 278 . 
60 (1996) 23 EHRR 413. 
61 sl5(3) IA 1971. 
62 R v SSHU exp. Chahal (1993) Times 27th Oct. CA. 
63 Supra n60 para.4. 
64 28038/95. 
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who had refugee status on the basis that his crimes were sufficiently 
serious to constitute a danger to the community under Art 33 (2) of the 
Geneva Convention. 
The prohibition on expulsion applies equally in the case of extradition 
proceedings. In Soering v UK the European Court held that the likelihood 
of the applicant being subjected to the 'death row phenomenon' on his 
extradition to Virginia would make extradition an Article 3 breach.65 
It has been established, that the ill-treatment does not need to be perpe-
trated by a state authority but there must be evidence to suggest that the 
state authorities are unwilling or unable to protect the applicant from 
such ill-treatment.66 Authority can be found for the proposition that a 
person who would suffer a serious detrimental effect to the health on 
removal could also bring an Article 3 challenge. In D v UK a broad inter-
pretation was given to Article 3 when it was held unanimously that 
removal of a person with aids would have breached Article 3.6 7 This 
decision was reached notwithstanding the fact that the applicant had 
entered the UK illegally and was therefore considered by the Court of 
Appeal to be making an application for leave to enter rather than to 
remain in the UK.68 
Conclusion: a right not to be deported? 
The rights under Article 3 are absolute. The decisions in Chahal and 
Ahmed indicate that no deportation or extradition order should be 
executed in cases where there is evidence that the deportee could experi-
ence inhuman and degrading treatment. It is these cases where the scope 
of the HRA will be most apparent given that Article 3 ECHR is couched 
in far wider terms than Art 33 of the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, 
people who may be in danger of experiencing persecution for a non-
Geneva Convention reason, for example, sexuality or gender, may be able 
to argue that their expulsion would contravene Article 3. The broad 
construction of inhuman and degrading treatment to cover health issues 
in the decision in D v UK may encourage domestic courts to look at wider 
issues than those raised by state - perpetrated violence. 
65 Soering v UK (1989) App. 00014038/88 07/07/89 para.111. 
66 H.L.R v France (1997) 00024573/94 29/04/97 . 
67 (1997) 24EHRR423. 
68 Ibid, para.48. 
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As far as Article 8 is concerned, there is more uncertainty in relatior 
interpretation as the decision maker must engage in a balancing act 01 
it is found that a case falls under Art 8(1).69 This will apply irrespective 
whether a person is being deported as an overstayer or in public gc 
cases, although in respect of the latter less will be required by 1 
Secretary of State to discharge the burden of proportionality. In Roys 
Fernandez,10 the IAT in calculating where the balance should lie, appl 
the decision in Bouchereau11 so that there needed to be evidence o 
present threat to the requirements of public policy for a right to family 1 
to be legitimate interfered with. 
Whereas appeal rights are retained in cases deemed conducive to t 
public good, the abolition of the right to appeal against other deportati 
orders in the IAA 1999 appears as either an irrelevant measure oi 
nonsensical measure. Advocates of the former perspective would contei 
that deportees could make an appeal under s65 IAA on the basis th 
their human rights are violated by the decision to deport; whereas adv 
cates of the latter perspective would argue that s63 and slO are at od 
with the spirit of human rights embraced by the Human Rights Act 19! 
and are therefore rather disingenuous.72 
Should the domestic courts and tribunals implement the spirit of tl 
Convention as evidenced in the Strasbourg decisions, there will emerge 
category of cases in which persons will have a legitimate challenge to 
deportation or removal decision. The extent of that category depends c 
how far the margin of appreciation is deferred to in the judicial proces 
However, for those people who can demonstrate that they may face il 
treatment on their return, whether or not perpetrated by a state authorit 
and those people who have well-established family ties in the UK, thei 
may indeed be said to be a right not to be deported under the HRA 199f 
69 For a discussion of this uncertainty see Warbrick "The Structure of Article 8" EHRLR [1998] 
Vol. 1 32 at 40. 
70 Appeal TH 24051/94 (12016) 12.4.1995. 
71 1978 1 QB 732; [1981] 2 ALL ER 924. 
72 The case law on Article 6 rends to support the view that rights relating to immigration and asylmr 
including deportation, do not fall within the ambit of Article 6 (P v UK (1987) 54 DR 211; Agee 
UK (1976) 7 DR 164). Similarly in relation to Article 7 it has been established that a deportatioi 
order is a security measure rather than a penal sanction (Moustuquim v Belgium (1991) 13 EHRf 
802). Furthermore, it is apparent that the ECHR views judicial review as an effective remedy unde 
Article 13 (Vilvarajuh v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 248). 
